Monday, 25 June 2018

Administration report on Vibe Tickets reveals Massie's story is not accurate.

When someone states its time to move on and that they are only now looking to the future, you can be pretty sure the thing they have left behind is not quite as they described. So it is with Vibe Tickets and Luke Massie's phoenix operation.

The administration of Massie's original ticket re sale company, TheVibe Ltd, is now underway.

It reveals two important points. The sole reason TheVibe was placed into administration by Massie was the debt owed to HMRC and the company's inability to pay it. A debt of £57,000 had accrued since December 2017 - so the report states. We revealed this in our last post. It shows very poor management. And kicks many of Luke's published excuses into the long grass.

The second and possibly more revealing point, is to do with the pre pack. Massie has always claimed he didnt plan any of this. According to the administrators, Massie made an immediate offer to them to purchase the assets of the company for £30k. Now the company had been advertised as being for sale but Massie's offer was the only one. This £30k was pushed up to £40k on negotiation. Then out of the blue the largest investor in Thevibe, put in an offer for £150k. Does that strike you as odd? £30k to £150k is not a normal auction jump. Then to add to this oddity, Massie immediately (2 days) put in another offer for £160k. This was from a guy who has claimed continuously that he had no money - which is why he couldnt invest in Thevibe. Out of the blue he shook the money tree and £160k fell into his pocket. So having tried to buy it for £30k, he ended up spending £160k.

£160k would have been enough to clear the old company's immediate debts and problems with HMRC but Massie has always claimed he tried to raise this but failed. Hmmmm. There is TRYING and there is trying. 

Massie has also always claimed that he would be able to pay of creditors with the sale proceeds. Well that will not happen. Estimates are currently that trade creditors will see 78p - imagine what they would have seen if Massie had got away with his £30k offer - zero. Thank goodness someone had the sense to offer a sum that would clear most of the debts - and it wasnt Massie. Muck like his assertion that all Crowdcube shareholders have been satisfied, its another hollow one. 

Thursday, 21 June 2018

Anyone for a Brew - Crowdcube success fails to file accounts and open new outlets

The Tea Brew Pub took £180k off Crowdcube members back in 2015. The promise was to have 10 units open in four years and then franchise. The pot is looking pretty empty.

Holland, the founder, cant even manage to get a simple set of small company accounts together for the filing which was due in March of this year. That is really totally unacceptable and unprofessional. It is indicative of sort of trash Crowdcube promote - daily. 

Failing to open any units bar its first, is not great news for investors after 3 years but it's not the end of the world if there are good reasons. Failing to carry out your duties as a founding director of the company is simply unforgivable when you have taken people's money.   

Yet another Crowdcube moment. 

Some real, unspun figures for Vibe investors.

It now looks as though Luke Massie's new Vibe is being valued at well under £5m. On Crowdcube 2 years ago it was valued at £6m but investors who put in £600,000 in 2016 are going to get lucky, as Luke gifts them free shares in the new Vibe. HMRC who were owed £57,000 by the now defunct old Vibe and are the main reason it was put into administration by Massie, are waiting to hear if they will get anything. 

Vela Technologies plc, a previous investor, has announced a £200k investment in the new Vibe Group Holdings in exchange for a 4% holding - valuing VHGL at around £5m. VGHL owns 97% of the new Vibe Tickets and various other Massie businesses. The other 3% is earmarked for the old Crowdcube investors under a pledge made by Massie to this blog.

The £200k is part of a £700k round to launch the newco Vibe Tickets after Massie bought the old Co which he put into administration. We have now news on where the other £500k is coming from but the Vela investment is unconditional. Vela itself is not riding high on AIM and the mess with Vibe has certainly got some interesting comments from investors.

The numbers are difficult to be sure of, but it looks as though that 3% of Vibe Tickets will be worth considerably less than the £600,000 investors put in 2 years ago. 3% of £5m is only £150,000. Massie has chosen to give them 3% of Vibe Tickets not 3% of VHGL. As VGHL is worth £5m and most of that comes from its 97% holding in Vibe Tickets, we can assume that the latter is worth less than £5m. So claims that all his Crowdcube investors, who bought 10% of the old co for £600k in 2016, will get like for like shares in the newco do not stack up. But that is no surprise.

In a series of deals which he definitely did not arrange in advance, he has done rather well when his loyal investors have not. Pure luck. On the flip side, he is under no legal obligation to gift 3% of the new Vibe's shares, so one could see this as an act of the benevolent dictator or entrepreneur.

In all of this, it has always struck me as odd that Massie claims the whole problem was caused by Matt Ewing, the boss of Elite Telecom, who had invested £600k prior to the CC round, having too much control due to a SH Agreement which the young Massie had failed to understand. He goes and on and on about how this tied his hands and he couldnt operate the company - which is poppycock. All it did was prevent him from raising new cash without consultation. We know the real reason he put it into administration now that the first report has been filed - very poor management. But where in all of Massie's arguments are Vela Technologies - who were also a substantial investor in Vibe, putting on £400k, under the same SH Agreement. Vela is run by an ex stockbroker - so if he cant read and understand a simple SH Agreement, what hope have Crowdcube investors? Or indeed Luke Massie.

Meanwhile Vibe Tickets as a business seems to be viable so long as Luke remembers this time to pay the company's dues to PAYE and NI. His judgements are still highly questionable and his reasons given for the collapse of the old Vibe do not stand up to scrutiny. 

Tuesday, 19 June 2018

Will Energie be ready for its projected IPO this year?

Energie raised £600k on Crowdcube in 2016 at a valuation of £15m. According to the pitch, one aim was to IPO in 2018 with an EBITDA of £2.9m 

Their ultimate stated goal is to have over 1m club members and nearly 600 fitness clubs by 2023. The accounts show the membership numbers rose by 8% in the financial year from 104k to 113k. So a way to go. 

These accounts are not a lot of use - the company made a small loss on what appears to be a zero net revenue but its hard to tell. 

Anyway we will keep both eyes and ears open for the impending IPO announcement. Values mentioned in the Crowdcube pitch state that the management are looking for an annualised run rate EBITDA in 2018 of £4.6 million which would give the company a £46m valuation based on a multiple of 10. I dont think annualised used here is a fitness term. 

Well blow me down with a feather - that was an easy 3X ROI, eh. 

Videogram Worldwide is latest Crowdcube failure

Videogram Worldwide took £55,000 of Crowdcube investors in 2014. Later that year it took another £50k of investors on a platform called Crowd for Angels. Now it has filed for dissolution. 

Oddly the Crowdcube round has been taken down but its still mentioned on the C for A site. 

Accounts for YE August 17 show zero cash but a small profit, although we suspect this is mistake as the share cap account has reduced by a similar amount. They have refiled accounts before. We wrote about their joke accounts and their ridiculous pitch here many years ago. 

Really no idea what happened here. The only fact seems to be that this was never a business worth investing my socks in, let alone £1. 

Yet another Crowdcube moment. Happy losses. 

Mr Gripit knows a good deal when he sees one. Is Crowdcube just for suckers?

It's probably a good idea to strike whilst the iron is still hot - a good idea for whom though? Jordan Daykin is back on Crowdcube with a newco - whilst his Gripit Fixings fall off the wall.

Daykin certainly knows how to milk a run. His newco, VPS, which he bought for £5m is now overfunding on Crowdcube. There wasnt much made of Gripit in the pitch. Gripit has raised £4.1m in two rounds on the platform. Lastest accounts for YE Dec17 show losses of £1.8m for the company - a nine times increase on the latest projections. The figures suggest something odd - read on.

Should shareholders worry that he has now turned his energy and attention to being CEO of VPS - a totally unrelated business, in a totally different industry? Well time will tell. Gripit is due to deliver a profit of over £3m this year. Clearly it must be on track or he wouldnt go wondering off.

Debs Meaden is a SH in Gripit - via that wonderful comedy series Dragons Den. What does she think? No comment.

The accounts were moved, so this loss of £1.8m is for 17 months. Interestingly the first 5 months of this were included in the Crowdcube pitch as 'historic' data. However if you add the losses for 'previous 12 months' and the year Jan to Dec 2017, you get a projected loss of only £1m in total. Now it is impossible to know if the discrepancy (£800,000) occurred before the CC raise dated 03/17 or in the period after that to 12/17.

In the light of recent events with the platform and the fact that accounting dates were moved in June 2017, you might be highly suspicious that old tricks are being played here.

It is certainly more grist to the mill when considering Crowdcube's FCA licence.

Sunday, 17 June 2018

One we missed. Rateragent closes down after some very odd Crowdcube numbers induced investment.

This is the Crowdcube model in action. Rateragent made several claims and produced some very interesting numbers in their 2015 Crowdcube pitch. It managed to raise £134k from 133 people who really should be ashamed of themselves.  

The company then filed one set of accounts for 2015 and has filed nout since - being closed by compulsory strike off in December 2017. Con? Well you judge. Revenues went from £170k to £2.6m in 2 years - well of course they didnt but that is what Crowdcube agreed to print so they could claim their commission. We will never know if there were any revenues  - losses for 2015 were more than double the Crowdcube figure. Our ridiculous accounting system means that we cant learn much from their filings. 

We called this back in 2015 - here. 133 of you didnt listen. Crowdcube made around £6k, everyone else lost the lot.

Its worth noting before you read the final paragraph that the company's strapline is -

Rateragent - Where transparency is Key. 

In a final baffling twist, Rater Agent Reviews Ltd, with the same logo, is now operating here. This company was incorporated in August 2017. Joshua Paul Rayner is the sole director and shareholder and was until a few months ago a director of One Moment Ltd - the parent of the original Rateragent and the company Crowdcube investors put their money into. Ring any bells?

Yet another Crowdcube moment and groundhog day.  

More poor results for Crowdcube funded companies keep pouring in.

Saying everything is brilliant when in fact you know its all over, is not a sensible or rational act. But is happens too often.

On the back of some alarmingly bad results for Crowdcube itself, Crowdcube announce that have they just had a record year. Well here is some more good news to add to that - 

Powervault - still in test phase and reported £1.5m loss for year when they had a loss of under half that in their projections. Time will tell.

Health-Connected - Further losses of £71,000 filed against profits of £3.6m 

Cauli Rice - as already reported way off even the altered projections. Excuses excuses.

Freetrade - Still in trials. Supposedly with revenues of £3.7m for YE Sept18.

ISO Spaces - live on Crowdcube and going nowhere. Filed loss of £250k against Crowdcube projection of £2.6m profit. Is it any wonder people dont believe them?

Witt - as reported, way off targets. 

In all, we have files on 37 companies due to report in May and June. Not one of those that have filed, have come even close to the projections used to sell the equity on Crowdcube. Not one. We have a waiting room of overdue accounts and our experience suggests most of these will go to the wall. We are not making this stuff up - it is real hardcore fact - no spin, no PRing. 

When something is so obvious, how can people still be stupid enough to swallow up more of the same. Equity Crowdfunding might work, but Crowdcube's model doesnt. It is centred on Crowdcube making commission, not on creating viable businesses. 7 years on and that is an indisputable fact.

Saturday, 16 June 2018

Crowdcube 2016/17 results are out. Revenues fell!!!...................

Crowdcube have  filed their accounts for YE September 2017. The news is not good. Revenues fell by 5% over the 12 months and the company filed yet more large losses - £4.626m. So where do they go from here?

The company managed to raise another £1m in May 2017 but this was at the same valuation as the previous public raise in September 2016. You can hear the massive wheels grinding to a halt as the bearings explode. 

The only good news we could find is that the loss for the year was lower than the previous year but when your turnover is falling  - what does it matter? Falling revenues are the result of falling funded completions - a 5% fall at this so called 'growth stage' is a disaster. We didnt expect to see that sort of collapse.

In a good piece in the Sunday Times, Luke Lang of Crowdcube is reported to have said that the year was record breaking one for the company with £90m invested via the platform. So £90m produced £3.8m revenue. That's an average commission of just over 4%. But we know their standard rate for SMEs is 7.5%. So smaller companies are paying for the larger ones? We had heard a rumour that Revolut used Crowdcube for free - maybe we can see that might be true from these numbers.

At that rate the company needs to be completing well over £180m in funding just to cover its costs of £7.5m. That simply is not going to happen using their model. This all comes at a time when recent disasters like Sugru and Thevibe are putting Luke et al into the limelight for all the wrong reasons. More disasters are in the wings - see next post.

Someone asked if the ECF sector was seeing a fall in activity. Well we are not sure but Syndicate Room reported a doubling in their deal flow, which suggests if you have a decent model and are honest, you can still make good things happen. 

This is what Crowdcube said about its progress in a recent shareholder update - 

This has led to an exceptional year where we’ve significantly increased the volume and speed of launching pitches, which has positively impacted other key metrics. 

Is it just me or is that statement totally at odds with their filed accounts? The referral to the exceptional year must mean exceptionally poor? Increased volumes must mean that they have for some reason been forced to reduce their commission rate? 

In this report they also state that the 2017 revenues will be £4m - the largest revenues since they started. This is clearly either misleading or wrong. We dont know what the figure could be if this refers to the calendar year 2017, but we do know the accounting year to September 2017 saw revenues of £3.776m. In a update to your own SHs, you would think the date reference would be the accounting year. Why would a finance company use the calendar year unless to mislead?

It doesnt even bear thinking about the original Crowdcube pitch projections for itself - the numbers are so crazy out of kilter we cant bring ourselves to print them here. 

The fall in losses is a direct result of a reduction in costs of £850,000 - that must mean Darren and Luke have forgone their bonuses.

Upbeat references to increased deal flow - ie more pitches than ever before, ignores the essential point we keep on making. Pushing out lousy businesses with fantasy plans and numbers, will not lead to success. Increasing numbers of failures, with many having more than interesting stories attached to them, are a direct result of pushing through over valued, poorly managed companies for the sack of their own revenue. Now even that is falling. Why - well to the state the bleeding obvious, investors are wising up. 

There is talk of a new funding round in 2018 - there is just enough cash to carry the company through to September without one. Given these results it will be interesting to see where they go for money. The profit and loss account is at minus £17m and counting. Meanwhile all indicators are heading south. It's not a ship I would want to be on.

Of course non of this will get into the ECF fake news press and probably wont make a dent in the national newspapers. If you are an investor, we'd like to hear your take on the way these numbers stack up and the way Crowdcube have managed their release. Get in touch via email as we need to be able to verify you are a SH. All off the record and anon. Thanks.

Friday, 15 June 2018

Farmdrop could be Crowdcube's watershed?

Farmdrop raised another £10m recently. They appeared on Crowdcube at the start of their journey and raised £750k. Now the valuation is five times higher. What's not to like?

Well for one thing they dont seem to be able to make up their mind what they are. Since the Crowdcube round, where they were hub based and pick up orientated, they now deliver. Using electric vans for the last few yards. A completely different business really - more of a dig it up and move it than a pivot. It has certainly delayed their progress.

In the Crowdcube pitch they stated that in 2017 they would have revenues of £70m. So as we all know, these are projections and cant be taken as fact. But you would hope they would be on the same planet as the real figures - wouldnt you? Otherwise, what is the point?

In their latest PR -  - they state that they are on target for £10m annualised revenue for 2018. This is a claim made with some considerable pride - one we should be applauding. Well guys when you compare that with your sales pitch for selling £750k of equity in your business, it looks well past its sell by date. 

Best we can say is; long way to go. I personally never believed that the UK shopper gives enough of a to take part in the Farmdrop revolution and if they did they would be already be out there supporting farmers markets. People's main anxiety these days is having it now, with as little effort as possible and as cheaply as possible. A very small percentage of us care enough to bother with this. The delivery is incredibly expensive to manage - much like the Deliveroo model - and profits will be elusive. It really doesnt have a USP and barriers to entry for existing food suppliers/delivery co's are low - if the model was ever going to be a success.

Then of course you have to consider the dark clouds of Brexit - which were not even on the horizon when 351 piled money into this via Crowdcube. Small farmers - the core of Farmdrop's supply chain - will be hardest hit and will likely go to wall in numbers in the first 5 years of the chaos we have brought down on ourselves.  

Might well be wrong but the numbers suggest not for now. 

Tuesday, 12 June 2018

Now we know - Thevibe or Vibe Tickets went bust because Luke Massie, the founder, failed to pay HMRC and owed them £57,000 on going into administration

The more we get to know about Thevibe's demise and resurrection as Vibe Tickets, the less we like it.

Not all the information is out - yet. But the initial filing shows Luke Massie's company owed HMRC PAYE and NI £57k. For a small business that suggests some seriously poor management. All his excuses turn to dust as we find out the real reason he called in the administrators. Debts to HMRC, once out of control, do tend to have this effect. 

We note that the total deficit is only £87k so the 'sale' of the company back to Luke Massie should leave that cleared up. We will have to wait and see. We will also wait to see if his promise of free shares in his new venture (well the old one rewrapped) Vibe Tickets, for all Crowdcube SHs, comes to pass. 

If I was an investor, which I wouldnt be as his ability to run anything is highly questionable, then I wouldnt want shares in this company, I'd just want rid of him.

Luke's PR keeps on purring as he gets Steve Bartlett - the wonderkid of SM - to interview him about how the poor lad has been hard done by in the press. FFS get a life. The interview is over a hour long and riddled with inconsistencies, lies and half truths. Bartlett should be ashamed of himself peddling this type of nonsense, when he removes comments and refuses to respond to Qs about why he has ignored the facts. Mind you, Bartlett says he thinks one of the most valuable lessons an entrepreneur can have is cold calling selling double glazing - essentially nuisance calling which is or should be illegal. The guy is a flake. Maybe one day Steve you will join the grownups and make some money but from looking at your accounts it wont be anytime soon. 

Monday, 11 June 2018

Stakis Daycare Nurseries - never opened and is now dissolved.

For all the use Stakis was  - it may as well have been a plant shop. Evros Stakis, the founder and son of the late Stakis empire builder Sir Reo Stakis, took £101,000 off Crowdcube investors in 2013 and spent it - but he never opened a single nursery.

This story is nothing unusual on Crowdcube - made up business with fictional plans and then a 3 year delay whilst it slowly dies. We will never know what happened to the money or indeed the idea if there ever was one. The plan was to open 80 nurseries. His other company Stirling UK Ltd has also closed.

This is what Evros said about the company's exit plans on the Crowdcube, FCA regulated, platform -

The Exit Strategy

In terms of exit, Investors should be encouraged to take a 3-year view given the Seed EIS cover, which they would forfeit if they exited within that period. Having said that, once it has built a story and track record, the Company intends to list within the next twelve months on the London-facing Danish exchange, GXG Markets. That, of course, does not preclude a trade sale in the interim to a recognised player in the childcare sector.

Yet another one to cross off my list.

Wednesday, 6 June 2018

Witt Energy top the Crowdcube pile of May disappointments

Witt raised £2.4m on Crowdcube in 2016. Their projections, used to encourage this investment, which was over 3 times their target, are now in pieces. Other companies also followed the trend in the month of May. 

Witt is a serious company creating a very serious renewable energy facility. Why then, you have to ask, are their financial projections on Crowdcube a total joke? There can only be one answer, the same one we have been giving for 3 years here - it's to get investors hands deep into and out of pockets.

There is one very consistent feature with all Crowdcube pitches. They dont just miss projections - they totally blitz them on the low side. When something is so bleedingly obviously wrong, why is it it cannot be corrected?

Witt had forecast profits for the YE August17 of £394k. They made losses of £470k. Whats more, this year, they have projected profits of £4.08m. How's that going Witt? And as we are on the topic, the one we never get off, how is this fair and not misleading?

Witt declared a £200k loan in the Crowdcube pitch, which was due for repayment in November 2018. This loan was in fact repaid in April this year in full. Obviously as the company raised an extra £1.65m on Crowdcube, they have cash. But it does seem a little odd to be giving £200k back 8 months early, when the company will need more cash soon. 

Other members of Crowdcube's over subscribed Disappointment Club for May are - 

Pallet Eater
Tidy Books Europe.

Plenty waiting in the wings for June and plenty late filing. 

Brewdog relaunches its US fundraising

Just when you thought it was safe to go out.......... Brewdog launch another $10m punk equity round in the USA.

Each one of the 800,000 new shares in the US subsidiary, is going for $50.  As you can see from the comments we didnt do a very job guessing the valuation. Its a lot. The now rather tattered fat cats were once again thrown from a helicopter over the City. I do hope the reaction to the funding is more imaginative.

The one crucial issue with BD is cash - they have stuck themselves a very long way out there - sort of a Napoleonic advance on steroids. There can be no retreat if the cash runs dry.

Should be fun to watch.

Phew - At long last Little Brew is shut down by the Government.

Little Brew raised £110k back in 2013 on Crowdcube. Its last filed accounts were for YE Sept 2014. So you can imagine it will come as some relief to Crowdcube investors that they can at last claim their loss relief 3 years late. 

Its a typical Crowdcube story. Great enthusiast Stuart Small, liked beer. He saw all these other beer enthusiasts raising money on Crowdcube and eureka, he invented Little Brew. He had no experience in brewing or business but then in 2013 on Crowdcube you couldnt get through half a pint before you had been given £100k. Of course all of this was and still is, orchestrated by the promotion of magic bean like profits and ROI. 

The fact that the company has been trying to close down for 4 years is something of an oddity. Is that a record? Eventually HMRC have stepped in and closed it will be on 18 June 2018. 

Thank god that's over. 

Tuesday, 5 June 2018

Here we go the round the ............... Bidstack reversed in to Kin Group.

So Bidstack. Founded by the same guy, James Draper, who was Head of Commercial at Shopwave (according to Crowdcube). Both used Crowdcube. Bidstack was valued on Crowdcube in 2015 at £1.1m. 

Bidstack has now been reversed into Kin Group - a shell co listed on AIM. It has been termed a reverse takeover. Kin had to take over someone by August this year or lose their AIM listing. The deal is still not completed.

It appears from said deal, that Kin are paying £400k for the entire share capital of Bidstack by way of investing this sum in the company. We are not sure what sort of accounts Bidstack have but from previous filings it doesnt look too pretty. Bidstack have been playing ping pong with their accounting dates since their Crowdcube raise. 

The other company Draper used to work at, Shopwave, had projected net profits on Crowdcube of £1.6m for 2016 but only managed to bring in losses of £50k. Silly old projections. 

Crowdcube investors, there are only 66 of them, will receive shares in Kin Group. Their shares are currently suspended.

This story reminds me of a few other recent events involving Crowdcube investors and steam rollers. I suppose it is that time of the year when the country fair lunatics are out and about and the ale is flowing. 

Be careful out there.

Monday, 4 June 2018

Cauli Rice aka Fullgreen are looking for money again - this time their numbers really dont add up!

As an investor, I am interested in how well company management deal with important issues. There isn't anything much more important for a growing company than raising capital. So why would you send out an email about a new round with a massive typo?

Ok, so I know this blog is littered with typos, but Im not asking for your money, yet. 

In its latest announcement to SHs, Fullgreen tells them that its 2018 expected revenues will see an increase of 869% on 2017. That is certainly a eye catching number and if true Id be putting some money in. But unfortunately it's not - the real increase is a somewhat sad 86.9%. Talk about handling expectations. 

What must be alarming for SHs is that the company raised £1.47m on Crowdcube (for the umpteenth time) at the start of 2018 and now they are back for more. As usual with Fullgreen, it's what they dont tell you that carries importance, rather than what they do. 

Ignoring the unbelievable gaff on the percentage increase, the sales for the UK for 2018 have already been reduced from £2.6m to £1.8m - that's since the last Crowdcube pitch in February 2018. This reduction is made up for (or most of it is) by projecting heavier future sales in the USA. Whilst they have achieved excellent distribution there and are looking to do the same in Australia, these projected sales are not certain. They are not numbers based on pull through. 

What happens if, like in the UK, sales flop? If you read reviews of their products, they get a large number of yuks. Far too many in our opinion. Is that why sales in the UK have been slashed by £800k or 30% in the last 3 months? Initial listings were excellent here but pull through sales have slowed (the yuk factor?) and now numbers for overall UK sales have been cut. That pattern has to be worrying. We have said many times on here and many many times about Fullgreen: initial listings are not the crucial thing - pull through sales are.

In the last Crowdcube pitch, they explained away a fall in turnover of 50% from the previous projections, as being down to a major listing being delayed. As they dont mention the large fall of UK sales in this latest email, they dont have to explain it either.  

This new raise is at the same value as the one earlier this year - so is essentially a down round if you take into account the £1.47m that went in in February. 

Another problem we have is that the last round, just 3 months ago, was to raise £400k and they achieved £1.4m - so that's more than 3 times the 'required funding' they talked about. Has turnover risen by 3 fold? No. Do they expect it to? No. So why have they run out this £1.4m when it's so much more than they told investors they required to do the same numbers? I think they are just not good with figures. Their reasons are that growth has outstripped the funding they have. Enough said.

Finally we couldnt help notice that in the Crowdcube IM for last February, Fullgreen wrote the following for investors information -

'We expect UK sales to continue to grow at a healthy year on year growth of 50% due to continued introduciton of new flavours and new product formats.'

So not only have they reduced the UK sales for 2018 by 30% (£800k), only 4 months ago they were confident that these sales would see increases of 50%. I think even they might have a problem explaining that. You also have to factor in the dramatic fall in the GDP for the product about ot be manufactured in the US  - a fall from 41% for UK sales to 29% for US sales. Meaning that for every sale lost in the UK, US sales have to increase by around 1.5 times just to stand still. 

In case you are wondering, the bronze geezer is the earliest example I could find of cauliflower ear. And why not.

Matt Newing casts new light on the TheVibe and Luke Massie

We will never really know what happened with Thevibe when it went into administration and was then quickly bought out by its founder Luke Massie. But at least now we have another side of the story.

An interview with Newing, who lost £600,000 when Thevibe closed, published in Business Cloud here makes for interesting reading. 

The total loss from Thevibe is yet to be known but one thing is for sure - there are some 'facts' out there that do not quite add up. 

For example, Luke Massie had enough money to buy the company out of administration and put it into his conveniently, newly formed Vibe Tickets Ltd, but he didnt have enough to rescue Thevibe. Yet the two amounts seem to us to be almost the same; especially as Newing had pledged another £75k. Newing claims all the talk about Massie being backed into a corner by legals is just a red herring. We have already said we think this too. Yet two of the three main backers of Massie, in fact all but Newing, have decided to fund him again. So how does that square?

Recent press does Massie few favours when it comes to taking him seriously

Massie says he has moved on. Which is fine so long as he hasnt forgotten his promise. 

Whatever the truth, Massie has now stated through this blog that he will give all Crowdcube investors shares foc, in Vibe Tickets, equivalent to the £600,000 worth of shares they held in Thevibe. Now this hasnt happened yet but he had better follow through on it if he wants to maintain any credibility, anywhere.

Sunday, 3 June 2018

Did the sale of i-Comply to Veracity UK Ltd give Crowdcube investors any return?

Around a year ago, i-Comply which had raised £50k on Crowdcube in 2012, was 'bought' by Veracity UK. Almost immediately it has started to make profits. But what did the 46 Crowdcube investors see?

We really have no idea. Nor do Crowdcube. Their web page for i-Comply doesnt even mention the sale. It would appear no one has informed them. Clearly if there had been even the slightest positive news for the 46 Crowdcube investors, the platform, never shy of creating a good story, would have plastered it wall to wall for all to lap up. 

Oh well at least the invention is now safe. Isnt that what they said about Sugru? Looks like the Crowdcube crowd are really just do gooders who love to see a great idea succeed but dont care if it benefits them. Hats off for that. 

Will Emoov's amalgamation solve anything?

We'd say the merger of Emoov, Tepilo and Urban is a positive move. But as the Irishman said when asked the way,  where are you coming from?

All three of these online estate agents have one thing in common, they burn large amounts of capital to make increasing losses.

The last year of filed accounts shows an accumulated loss of around £8m. So maybe there will be economies of scale with one administration cost instead of three? Will this scaling up of the brand (whatever the new one is) have an impact on the Purple Bricks market leadership? Probably not. 

Amusingly, according to the ex Dragon James Caan, who is a major backer of Emoov, this was not a merger. His story is that it was a takeover by Emoov of the other two. If this is true and no one but Caan is claiming it is, then that could be good news for 765 investors who put £2.62m into the company via Crowdcube in 2015.

The 2015 Crowdcube pitch had the usual grotesquely inflated projections and showed the company making losses for YE April 2017 of ~£1.6m, when in fact the loss was £3.1m. But who cares, eh? According to Crowdcube the event was a merger.

Now the 765 have a smaller share in larger pie. Lets hope that it doesnt fall to bits when its cooked. 

Tuesday, 29 May 2018

Our new evidence suggests Sugru and Crowdcube knew more than they told investors.

We can reveal, exclusively, that Sugru hired a Finance Director who had moved from a previous role where a £350k fraud had taken place under his watch. Even though this information was in the public domain, Crowdcube failed to notify their investors who have now lost the £5.5m they invested in Sugru.

Information we have, shows that the accountant, an accredited Financial Director with the FD Centre, was in the FD role at Idio Ltd when Natalie Saul, an accountant, stole £350,000 off the company in broad daylight. Following this, he moved from Idio in 2016 - the theft took place between 2015 and 2016. Natalie Saul used over 400 fake invoices and the crime was only uncovered when she went on maternity leave and a new accountant found it. For obvious reasons we are not revealing the name of the FD. We tried to contact him but he wasn't answering.

We also reached out to the FD Centre and Sugru but they haven't commented. The FD Centre stated that as this wasnt in the public domain, they couldt comment. They clearly hadnt read the newspapers.

This FD was an early investor in Sugru and later became the company FD. To be clear there has never been any accusation made against him linking him to the fraud. Bit like Loris Karius, he just missed it when it was his job to stop it.  

The FD makes no mention of his time at Idio Ltd on his extensive list of experiences on Linkedin. However we have evidence that he is the same person who worked at Sugru. Natalie Saul was accused and admitted the fraud at the end of 2016, well before the second Sugru raise on Crowdcube. 

So you have to ask, firstly why did Sugru employ this man to run their finances, did they know about the Idio evidence? Did Crowdcube check this man's background - did they hide this from investors or were they simply ignorant of the facts. Would you invest in a company with such aggressive financial targets if you knew the FD had missed such a colossal fraud in a recent job? How is it possible he is considered competent with that record? Why is he still registered with the FD Centre as a Financial Director?

Did this have any bearing on the mess Sugru are now in re their bank covenants? After all, it was this financial failure that forced the sale of the company for a fraction of its quoted worth, leaving Crowdcube investors with empty pockets. 

All of this reflects poorly on Sugru - but then we know the management were poor. What does it say about Crowdube? Well pretty well everything we have been saying for 6 years. This comes on the same day that the platform are advertising for a new Head of PR at £80k plus perks. Haven't they worked it out yet? They do not need to be spinning more fairy tales and paying £80,000 to some spiv; they need to be presenting good quality, honest, SMEs and start ups with careful DD. Wake up guys. 

It is time entrepreneurs learnt some lessons about how to ruin their dreams with equity crowdfunding

It is good that most liars eventually get caught. Promoting your business on Crowdcube using projections that are totally divorced from reality will eventually kill your business.

There is a classic case on Crowdcube right now. Craved raised cash on Crowdcube with fantastic projections. Now that money has run out with break even a distant dream, they are trying to raise more. But in 2018, investors are waking up to Crowdcube's games.

When you predict revenues of £1m and you achieve £185k  - 'learning curve' doesnt quite cut it with irritated investors. It would have done in 2016 but this game has now become so commonplace that even Crowdcube investors have had enough. There is no trust that this business will ever deliver a single promise it makes or that it even cares a hoot for its investors. 

Had they pitched with sound financial projections the first time and missed them by say 100%, then things might now be different. Even an extension on the pitch has fallen flat. They clearly sought and took some very very bad advice. 

We hoped that businesses would learn from this - we have been warning about it for years. Judging from some of the live campaigns at the moment, it seems a forlorn hope. This really is a crying shame because some of these businesses might in fact have been able to achieve something. But the stupidity of the Crowdcube model will ruin this for them. It is and will continue to be a harsh lesson. 

Monday, 28 May 2018

Pavegen looking for more money but not on Crowdcube

Pavegen raised £1.9m on Crowdcube a while back. That's gone, so they are raising what appears to be £3m - mainly from VCs but they have earmarked £250k for existing investors. Some of their claims are mysterious.

Nothing too wrong so far.

However as with previous rounds, some of the claims made in the IM are a little flexible - misleading even?

Take for instance the first commercial use of their paving in the UK at the Mercury Shopping Centre in Romford - a small 6 by 6 installation at one of the entrances.

In the IM, Pavegen state that this shopping centre has a daily footfall 60,000 and that these footsteps will now be generating information and electricity and in turn, real revenues for the company. 60,000 per day equates to 21,900,000 per year. Being the company's first commercial gig and being as they have included it in a request for new funding with virtually no other financials, you would expect the numbers used to be ball park accurate, at worst.

The Mercury Shopping Centre, that's the same one in Romford,  has a website operated by the owners, Ellandi. In my time, I have dealt with many shopping centres and I think its fair to say that along with events companies, they share a generous idea of their own success. Ellandi claim that this centre - the one in Romford, has an annual footfall of 9.7m. You can check it here. That's a daily  number of around 26,500. So well under half the number printed in the IM produced by Pavegen and sent to investors to solicit £250k. And dont forget this official footfall number is likely to be high.

In the IM Pavegen talk about the VCs. According to the IM, a 'signed Term Sheet for £3m has already been signed.' When a company has to emphasise something this way, you do have to wonder. As we all know, a singed or unsigned Term Sheet is not a slam dunk. 

Trust is a wonderful thing. Once lost, it is unlikely to return. 

Friday, 25 May 2018

This is Crowdcube's new attempt to empathise with red faced investors!

Affresol are in liquidation - we knew about this a while ago. Crowdcube now have a handy easy sympathy message for all their disappointed investors It's an improvement on saying nothing, which is what they have been doing since 2011. Maybe on these they should remove the strap line? I think our logo above is more fitting. We have written about them before here

Affresol is in liquidation

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We understand that Affresol is now in liquidation. I'm sure that this news will be extremely disappointing for you as an investor in the company.

If applicable, you should have received your SEIS3 or EIS3 form to enable you to claim any tax relief you may be entitled to and if you haven’t yet done this, we recommend you do so. Income tax relief can be claimed within five years of the year you made the investment.

If appropriate, loss relief is also available under SEIS or EIS. You should seek professional advice if necessary. For more information about tax relief, please visit the HMRC website:

 HMRC - 'How to claim EIS tax relief'
 HMRC - 'How do I claim my SEIS tax relief'

Once again, we understand your disappointment and if you have any further queries please do let us know.

Kind regards,
The Crowdcube Team
Crowdcube on FacebookCrowdcube on TwitterCrowdcube on linkedinCrowdcube on Google+
Capital at risk. Investments of this nature carry risk as well as potential rewards. 
Click here to read the full Risk Warning.
Copyright © 2018 Crowdcube Limited. All Rights Reserved.
Crowdcube HQ | Fourth Floor | Broadwalk House (South) | Southernhay West | Exeter | EX1 1TS

Have a great Bank Holiday Weekend!

This is what the Sugru and Crowdcube argument is about

Above are the notes on page 30 of the last Sugru (Formformform Ltd) full and audited accounts for YE Dec 2016. This pertains to the movement of the bank loan and personal CL from long term liabilities to current liabilities. The big Q is was this information hidden from Crowdcube investors in March 2017?

Sugru have claimed in a written statement that the breach that caused this movement of the loans and the cancellation of the extended facility with the Clydesdale occurred in late 2017, was immaterial and was therefore not declared to Crowdcube SHs.

They have also claimed that the breach referred to above is a different breach to the one that took place in 2016.

It seems they want it both ways. If the material breach occurred late on 2017, what is it doing in the 2016 accounts. Balance sheets do contain information about actions that have taken place after the YE date - but these are as notes and they should not change the numbers for the YE date ie December 31st 2016. If the breach referred to here is immaterial, why does it result in the moving of around £2.5 of debt facility - a move that puts the current account into deficit when they told investors in May 2017 it was £1m in credit.

It all seems pretty obvious to us. You SHs need to complain firstly to Crowdcube and then the Financial Ombudsman. Crowdcube, if found to be liable, will have to compensate you. 

Thursday, 24 May 2018

How to complain to the FCA

A friend very kindly sent this through and I thought it might be useful for anyone wishing to look at taking action against Crowdcube and or Sugru. I have to say my experiences with Ombudsmen is not good.

I have complained against companies that have ripped me off and have been complained against so here it is.

No matter how much fuss you kick up, and is on the message boards, the FCA won’t do a thing. They are not listening and not even monitoring.

They’re basis for taking action is complaints that are upheld by the Ombudsman

If any FCA company gets one or more complaints which are upheld by the Ombudsman, then suddenly the FCA is all over the offender. But under their light touch regulation, they have to identify a problem before they investigate it.

You need to get one of the investors or many of them to complain to Crowdcube. Standard stuff is we were presented misleading information to make our decision on. As such I want my money back.

Crowdcube then has 28 days to investigate and find a way to make the client happy.

If the investor is not happy he can then complain to the ombudsman (the FCA is now aware and monitoring events via the ombudsman).

The ombudsman investigates and has the power to get Crowdcube to refund all the investors money.

These are the proper channels for getting results. The FCA doesn’t listen to anything else

What Notes dont tell you - but we did.

Notes are back on Crowdcube, as expected. They have run out of your money. They dont tell investors what they told them last time, as that would be a real downer on their pitch. We told you back in March of this year but you dont seem to have listened. The pitch is funded.

When you have read through all the guff that Notes produce about how fantastically they have done since 2008, sit back and read this. And this -

In 2015 they told everyone that they would have revenues of over £13m for YE June 18. They now say that its truly great that they have reached almost £5m. In 2015, they said they would have EBITDA of £1.87m by now. Now they are very happy with £200k. A net profit was projected whereas we are looking at large losses.

At some stage surely someone is going to do somehtig about the word 'misleading' when it comes to the FCA's use of it in regulating ECF platforms. How is the above not totally misleading? None of the information from the 2015 pitch is inlcuded in this one - only up notes on how brialliant the whole thing has been. 

Ok, so we all know it takes longer and its never possible to rely on projections - so why have them if they are so totally misleading? Well Crowdcube need them to show the 'big numbers' out there - the big numbers get the juices flowing. Crowdcube couldnt exist without them. And lest we foget, this is ALL about Crowdcube. 

As the fog on the Sugru debacle thickens, we have a lead that may prove the 2017 raise should never have been allowed.

Sugru screwed Crowdcube investors for around £6m. It now seems confirmed that the breach that occurred in their banking facility with Clydesdale Bank, prior to the 2017 pitch, was material and was hidden from investors.

It all depends on interpretation. Sugru claim it was not material but they admit it happened and they admit they and Crowdcube agreed not to tell investors. Thereby materially altering the company position presented by the platform - which claimed the £3.5m facility was 'secure'. The accounts for the period confrim that the breach resulted in the loan, due to be repaid in 2019 was moved into current liabilities. That is material. 

This is Paraic's (a board dierctor at Sugru)  extraordinary explanation of these events - 

As for the “discrepancy” you mention, there is none. In the crowd cube pitch the bank loan (£2M) and loan from junior debt holders (£0.5M) were both classified as long-term debt. In the Dec 2016 statutory accounts these two amounts were classified as current liabilities. Hence, the net current liability position in the statutory account looks worse than the net current asset position in the CrowdCube pitch. It is purely a classification change. Again, no “smoking gun”.

Paraic if you read the accounts, the reason given for moving the debt from LT to ST liabilites is the breach of the covenant. They were moved not 'classified'. This movement put your company into a net deficit on its current account. Most of us consider that to be a highly important fact that should have been shared with investors in the 2017 Crowdcube raise. You clearly dont but you give no reasons for this curious decision. Perhaps accounts are not your thing. This is not just a smoking gun - it's a bleeding, recently dead body with a large bullet hole,  also.  

Sugru go on to say that the Bank's withholding of the balance of the loan was not the reason the company had to be sold. They later go on to say that cash issues played a significant part in the course of events. They clearly cant add 1 and 2 up and get to 3. As we have said before the collapse was down to very very poor management. Full stop.

Which ever clever way you try to spin this  - it all reeks of collusion and fixing. How Crowdcube will get away this, as they undoubtedly will, will be interesting.

We have been approached by a source who has another take on this and it is one that the platform will not be able to get away with if it turns out to be true. It is certainly material and it was never mentioned either. 

Watch this space!

Wednesday, 23 May 2018

Sugru's filed accounts reveal what their 2017 Crowdcube pitch failed to.

As we keep digging, we keep finding. 

Crowdcube investors in March to May 2017 were shown the 'projected accounts' for the company's YE Dec16 in the pitch documents - ie they were actuals. These showed a reasonably healthy current account balance of £1m credit. 

Now the filed accounts, which remember were for YE Dec16, so had already been completed 5 months before the Crowdcube pitch closed, show a very different story. These accounts were not made public until December 2017, so there is no way that anyone outside the company other than Crowdcube, would have known the real figures.

These accounts show a current account deficit as at 31 December 2016 of £337,528. 

This difference of £1,337,528 is around the amount that the company states it was due from the Clydesdale, in the second tranche of their agreed loan. The one they had breached but hadnt told people about - the one the bank withdrew which resulted in the fire sale.

That seems pretty clear to us. Crowdcube told investors the exact opposite of the truth in the 2017 raise. Maybe this was because Sugru hid it or maybe not. Either way it shows Crowdcube's due diligence is totally worthless. 

Tuesday, 22 May 2018

You simply must read this post on the Sugru Crowdcube forum

It is quite long, so I wont interrupt -

Insiders win / Outsiders lose

maximator 2 days ago
8 Replies
Indeed an astonishing exit @ 90 pct discount to equity value at last raise a good year ago. Sure we have all taken calculated risks, and this is one of the outcomes that was to be expected. HOWEVER, I find it hard to believe that the bank's withdrawal made a fire sale unavoidable, even with unforeseeable (?) challenges in DIY distribution. So the case indeed raises serious questions as to governance, and why we should pay to warm our Directors' cold feet, instead of being able to rely on them exercising their fiduciary duties to everybody's benefit, including ours.
Questions which only the Directors can answer. So I wrote to them today (see below). Let's see what they say.
Keep you posted. Any support / observations welcome.
PS: At least one question missing from my list below, i.e.: Have the Directors / founding shareholders / current top management agreed on continued employment / advisory relationship with Tesa, and on what terms ?
Dear Roger, Jane, Paraic & James,
Thank you for your letter, and congratulations to you on your successful exit.
To me, having acquired shares in the last round of crowdfunding in 2017, this is very disappointing news indeed. How disappointing the news is for the other shareholders depends, I suppose, on the timing and terms of their respective investments.
At this point, as an outsider, I cannot exclude that the incumbent shareholders / Directors may have misled the new investors in the last round of fundraising with the purpose of making a final bet for their own benefit, very largely at the expense of the new shareholders. All this based on a – from today's perspective certainly, and probably even then, taking into considerations the terms of the first crowdfunding - grossly overstated valuation (i.e. 10 x the equity valuation realised only slightly over a year later). For a relatively mature player already profitably active on a highly international scale in both production and distribution, it certainly appears to be highly unusual that the same set of insiders should have revised their views on equity valuation down by 90% within a year. In other words, the final crowdfunding round led to only minimal dilution of the incumbent shareholders' stakes at the time, at the full expense of the last entrants.
The sale to Tesa on these terms, at this time, therefore raises a number of serious questions, in particular with respect to conflicts of interest of the managing incumbent shareholders / Directors vis-à-vis the later shareholders.
May I therefore ask for your co-operation in addressing these concerns, by responding to the questions below. Given the very unfortunate short timeframe of only a few days between your announcement and scheduled completion, I am forced to hereby formally challenge and object the sale itself as well as the lawfulness of the execution of the drag-along right.
Finally I am concerned about the potential reputational aspects of this sale for the Sugru brand. Please allow me, therefore, to share this letter with the Board of Directors of Tesa S.E., and to post it on the respective crowdfunding platform you used in 2017.
Yours sincerely
Minutes of all Board meetings since 1 Jan 2016
Complete copies of any and all business plans and valuation reports on the company produced by it, its advisers, employees, Directors, consultants or similar, since 1 Jan 2016
Any pay-outs to Directors and advisors since 1 Jan 2016 (including cash salaries, stock grants, etc.)
Full copy of the Sale & Purchase agreement with Tesa, including all Annexes etc.
Detailed table of amounts of Sources and Uses of Sale proceeds, including:
Their respective timing (if not paid-out at proposed closing in May 2018)
Allocation of proceeds to each of the Directors and founding shareholders
Analysis of financial returns to equity, expressed as percentage p.a. (Internal Rate of Return), and amount (in GBP), including:
In aggregate since foundation
Broken down into classes of shares
Broken down into cohorts by timing of initial investment (i.e. For each funding round until exit)
Individual returns of the Directors and founders
How were the conflicts of interest of the founders / Directors vis-à-vis the later shareholders managed specifically over time ? (pls provide detail)
Why did the bank withdraw from further debt financing ?
Why did the company not disclose to shareholders at the time that such withdrawal had taken place ?
To preserve value, what alternative funding sources did the Board take into consideration following the bank's withdrawal ? Why did the Board instead ultimately decide to fire-sell ?
Did the Board / Directors actively consider there was a risk of insolvency ? If so, why ? If not, why not ?
Disposal process
Who prepared and negotiated the sale (including advisers, legal counsel, consultants, etc.)
How was Tesa selected as the buyer ? Was there a competitive bidding process ? Please provide details (number of parties approached, engaged, negotiated with, etc.)
Were negotiations with Tesa conducted exclusively at some stage ? Why ?
Please disclose on what basis and how (exactly, i.e. including methodologies, amounts, etc.) the Company was valued as a basis for sale negotiations ? How exactly did this valuation differ from the ultimate purchase price achieved ? Please provide a detailed and reasoned reconciliation
In particular, provide details on the Enterprise Values (i.e. Value of the firm as opposed to certain classes of capital / assets) derived for the last round of crowdfunding vs. Enterprise Value achieved in the sale to Tesa (including a reasoned deviation analysis)
Purchase price
Is the entire purchase consideration proposed to be paid entirely in cash, at closing in May 2018 ?
If so, did the Directors consider negotiating contingent / deferred purchase price elements to allow the (later) shareholders to participate in the future performance of the Company ? If not, why not ?
Did the Directors consider introducing amendments to the distribution of proceeds which would have made-whole, or at least reduced the severe losses of, the later shareholders ? If not, why not ?
Proposed use of proceeds from the sale (in GBP) (in detail, including fees, and allocation of sale proceeds to individual classes of shares)
0 days left
An impressive list of questions which I assume might by the basis of an unfair prejudice application to the court. Good luck with that. I only invested a tiny amount so I've taken it on the chin as a good lesson learnt.
Rip off in broad day light :-)
They new they are going to do it.
Let the court decide. I am in :-)
Good list of questions - doubt you will receive answers to all of those (if any). Been radio silence from Crowdcube and Sugru on deal specifics so far. They will likely hide behind 'confidentiality' so as not to reveal what really went on.
Unfair Prejudice proceedings still leave the burden of proof on us. Yet the breach of provisions of the Articles is obvious. No offer was made to the minorities, in breach of para. 7 of the Articles. Also, it is not clear that para 8 (Drag-along) should override para 7. Even if that were so, Tesa does NOT qualify as a bona fide **arm's length ** purchaser according to para 8.1. of the Articles, not the least because of the envisaged continued employment of the Selling Shareholders. Such employment agreement in fact turns the unrelated parties (arm's length) into RELATED parties (NOT arm's length).
Also, the communication of the Company is inconsistent with the Drag-Along-Notice. The latter stipulates the price per share (@ GBP 0.09 / share), as required by 8.2.3 of the Articles, whereas the former is vague on final proceeds, claiming its dependency on currency conversion of financial debt. Unacceptable / invalid.
If all that were not enough, we have to date not received proof that the Conflict-of-Interest rules of the Articles have been properly adhered-to by the Directors in the process of resolving, and effecting, the sale.
The resolution may be, and the Sale and Drag-Along ARE in breach of the Articles, and therefore invalid. As a result of all this, I specifically call on the Selling Shareholders to exit from the Share Purchase Agreement. In particular, I specifically deny any Director's right to act on my behalf in transfering my Shares to tesa SE (para 8.7. of the Articles).
It does appear to me to have been shoddily handled at best.
My reading of it is they were/are very badly advised and left at the mercy of the only game in town who realized this and cut the offer at the last moment and the current directors decided that it was still best for them (as the main shareholders) and the staff to take it and keep their jobs. It could for example have been structured as an asset rather than a company sale.
It doesn't feel that they gave much consideration to the more recent shareholders - to not even delay completion a little so that the first round crowdfunding investors who are only a month or so away from a three year EIS hold suggest they really don't care about them.
There appears to be a question mark as to whether the company was already in breach of its banking covenants in March - May 2017, and if so I cannot see that this was disclosed. It is certainly material. Does anyone have any news of this please before I write to the company asking for proof that it was not in breach at the time.
A 91% devaluation in less than 12 months is not consistent with the tone of the pitch, I am sure that if we pursue this then we will find more information about the state of the company in the last pitch.
I am certainly open to being involved in any class action. This process has been disappointing from the perspectives of both Sugru and Crowdcube; it brings all other investee companies into question and suggests this may be the wrong platform to invest through.
As far as I am aware, the company is denying that they were in breach of the covenants at the time.
One thing is clear though, based on the handling of this from Crowdcube, it is absolutely the wrong platform to invest through.
I should like to see evidence of this as well as correspondence from the bank as to the level and conditions of support on offer; the pitch makes reference to an agreed £3.5m facility agreed.